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Introduction
Most Eiuopean labor markets are characterized by both relatively high and relatively cyclical imemployment rates for lower educated workera. In recent literature, most attention has gone out to explain the relatively high stock of low skilled unemployment, see e.g. Layard et al. (1991) , OECD (1996) , Nickell and Bell (1996) . There are four main explanations for this fact. First, skill biased technological change in an imperfect labor market can lead to a fall in the demand for lower educated workers. Second, increased competition and international trade leads to a change in the industrial structure. Third, wage floors like for example the minimum wage reduce labor demand for unskilled workera. Besides those three explanations which focus on the demand side, there is a fourth explanation which focuses on the supply side of the labor market. According to this explanation, unskilled workers have higher replacement rates when unemployed and thus they have less incentives to work.
The fact that the unemployment rate of lower educated workers increases relatively strongly in cyclical downturna (for evidence see e.g. Van Ours and Ridder, 1995) is generally explained by the fact that firms typically invest more in job specific capital for highly educated workers. The highly educated workers will therefore be hoarded during recessions and the lower educated workers will be laid off. See e.g. Oi (1968) and Hamermesh (1993) . 1 In addition to the explanations just mentioned there is the less familiar explanation of "crowding out"of lower educated workers by workera with a higher education. This explanation has been rather popular in the Netherlands (see e.g. Asselberghs et al. (1997) and Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) and has been iised to explain both the high unemployment rates for lower educated workers (dociunented in Table 1 ) and the fact that low skilled unemployment is more cyclical.
One of the first models of job competition and crowding out was developed by Thurow (1975) . In this model, the labor market is not a market of matching demand and supply for various job akills but one of matching trainable individuals with training ladders. Moreover, the marginal product is associated with jobs rather than with workers. In this view, the labor market is a closed system. When there is a fixed amount of jobs with fixed characteristics (including wages) and an exceas supply of labor, it is likely that higher educated (and cheaper trainable) workers who cannot find a job will accept jobs below their level at the crost of workers with intermediate skills, who will in tiun accept simple jobs. Finally, at the end of the line there are the lowest educated workera who become iinemployed. The problem with thia explanation is that the composition of var 1Pfann and Palm (1990) give evidence that adjustment casts are much higher for white collar workera. Also note that when workera who become unemployed looae akilla, thete will be persistence in the level of low akilled unemployment and the diatinction between cycfical and structural unemployment vaniahea. cancies does not adjnst at all to the composition of the labor market. Moreover, both employers and workers who are employed below their job level can improve their position by forming better matches and it is therefore hard to believe that crowding out is a long lasting structural phenomenon. If one looks at cross coimtry comparisons, the evidence also strongly suggests that coimtries with a highly edttcated labor force have relatively more complex jobs than cotmtries with a relatively lower ediicated labor force. Similazly, we see that over a longer time span, both the fraction of simple jobs and the fraction of workers with a lower education has fallen. This suggests that in the long rtm, the composition of jobs and workers move in the same direction. There is also a 5mdamental measiuement problem associated with structiual crowding out since we never observe worker skills and job reqturements exactly. It is therefore virtually impossible to correctly label someone to be overqualified for a partictilar job. One basically has to make the extreme asstunption that the econometrician observes more than the individual firm and worker who have decided to form a matc.h. Moreover, the job reqtrirement is often not fiilly determined before the formation of a match. Hence, we camiot conchtde from the simple fact that some workers with a higher education occupy simple jobs that crowding out takes place. It is therefore likely that crowding out, if ptesent, is a cyclical phenomenon.2 An early model that allows for cyclical crowding out is the one by Okun (1981) who has sitggested that in bad times it is costly to adjt~st wages and that firms will therefore increase their hiring standards instead. A different reason for cyclical crowding out is given by st.andard job seazch theory. When it takes time for workers and vacancies to find each other, a possible strategy for higher educated workers is to temporary accept. a simple job and to continue searching for a more c,omplex job which pays a higher wage. There are however also reasons to believe that cyclical crowding out is an unlikely outcome. McCormick (1990) shows for example that skilled workers may be rehictant to accept unskilled jobs even on a temporary basis becai~se of fear of stigmatization. Therefore, tmemployed higher educated workers tend to invest in job search, rather than take an interim position at an unskilled job.
The empirical evidence on the existence of cyclical crowding out is mixed. The general approach that has been followed is to relate a measure of labor market tension to the education-job level distribution. Teulings and Koopmanschap (1989) iise regional differences in tmemployment rates as a meastue for labor market tension. They fotmd that the relative change in the employment share of workers with a lower editcation at occupations for which, in general, only a lower education is required is lower in regions with high tmemployment, and they therefore conclitde that there is crowding out. A problem with this approach is 2Hecker (1992) has atgued that from 1970 onwards, an increasing number of U5 college students were employed at "high school jobs". This paper got a lot of attention in the popular press. Tyler et al. (1995) showed however that during the 80's, the fraction of young college graduates at "high school jobs" declined and that their real earnings increased. that the analysis foctuses on occupations rather than job levels.. It can therefore not be niled oiit that the results aze driven by differences in adji~stment costs between workers with different. education levels at the same occiipations. Moreover, workers can move freely between regions. Van Ours and Ridder (1995) iise V~U ratios of different labor market segments to test for cyclical crowding oiit. A necessary condition for crowding out in their model is that an tinemployed worker is better of seazching at lower level jobs. The approach of Van Oius and Ridder fociises at the supply side of the labor market. The idea is that crowding out takes place when the ratio of unemployed job seekers to vacancies in a partictilaz segment exceeds the ratio of imemployed job seekers to vacancies in the lower neighboring segment. Only then, it becomes optimal to supply labor below one's level. Except for workers with an academic degree they find no evidence that the V~U ratio's are higher at lower labor market segments and they conclude that the disproportionately high unemployment rates for lower educated workers mi~st be due to the higher firing rate that this group faces.
Van Oius and Ridder find that supply orientated cyclical crowding out is lazgely irrelevant. We focus on demand orientated (cyclical) crowding oiit. Oiu data allow us to directly test at the firm level whether the quality of the workforce increases during periods of high unemployment. The data we i~se aze unique in the sense that they contain information on both worker, job and firm chazacteristics. Other advantages of our data are that they are based on administrative records, that the key variables for crowding out (education and job complexity level) are measured independently and that we observe both new and separating workers. If cyclical crowding out is important, firms reqiure more schooling at given job complexity levels during bad times. We will therefore test whether the difference in years of schooling between the inflow and outflow of workers for a given job level in a pazticiilar firm, is lazger during low employment yeazs. Unlike some of the previot~s studies, which restricted crowding out to be an inflow phenomenon only, we will allow crowding oiit to be the result of a combination of inflow and oiitflow policies at the firm level. Moreover, we can directly observe whether upgrading is the result of the oiitflow of workers with a relatively lower education or whether it is cai~sed by the inflow of workers with a relatively higher education, at given job levels.
An additional advantage of oiu data is that we have information on gross hourly wage data to distinguish between substitution and piue crowding out and that we can test whether the rettuns to schooling are still positive when we condition on job complexity levels. Our findings suggest that the wage differential between new workers who have followed relatively many years of schooling and their direct colleagties (in the same firm at the same job level) is almost zero.
The discussion on crowding out has aLso entered the policy arena. F4om a welfare point of view, crowding oiit can never be a first best sohition since potential productivity is not used. It is therefore often argued that policy makers should stimulate job creation at the top segment of the labor mazket when crowding out exists (see e.g. Asselberghs et al. (1998) ). This is sometimes called a"choking chimney" policy. If on the other hand, the high and cyclical tmemployment rates for workers with a lower education are catused by any of the explanations mentioned at the beginning of this paper, policy makers cottld better directly focus at the bottom segment of the labor mazket. Another conventional wisdom is that when there is crowding out, there is no need for extra education of low skilled workers since those workers wotild occttpy simple jobs anyway.3 This view is also typically based on a static and mechanical view of the labor market. If crowding out is for example the result of seazch frictions, better schooling will lead to the opening of more complex job vacancies and will lower overall unemployment. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data we use for testing the empirical relevance of crowding otit and present some descriptive statistics. In section 3 we test to what extent employers exploit recessions to improve the average skill level of their work force at given job complexity levels. Finally in section 4, we investigate whether workers with relatively many years of education at a given job level earn higher wages than their direct colleagues at the same job level in the same firm.
2 Data and descriptive statistics 2.1 Data For this paper we have tt.sed the AVO data set of the Depaztment of Social Affairs and Employment which covers the period 1992-96. The data were originally collected to obtain information on the development of wage income for different categories of workers and are based on administrative records of firms by means of a stratified two step sampling procedure. In the first step a sample of firms is drawn from the Department's own firm register (which is roughly similar to the firm register of Statistics Netherlands).4 In the second step a sample of workers is drawn within each of these firms.
At the first stage, a sample of firms was selected tising a stratified (by indttstry and firm size) design. The number of strata changed between surveys. In 1993, the sample that. we use consists of 1682 firms which were drawn from 80 strata, in 1994, the sample consists of 1563 firms from 280 strata, in 1995, the sample 3The following remarks from the popular press re8ect this popular view. Robert Samuelson wrote in a Newsweek column of August 1992: "...~Iff more people had gone to college in the 1980's they would have competed mostly for lower-wage joós that usually don't require a degree".
In the same year, Sylvia Nasar wrote an article with the suggestive title "More College graduates taking low-wage jobs" in the New York Times. contains 1375 firms from 312 strata, and in 1996 there are 1548 firms from 328 strata. Particularly firms with less than 10 employees are under-represented.
At the second stage, a sample of workers was drawn from the firms which were selected in the first step. This was done as follows.~om small firms (c20 employees) the entire work force was sampled whereas for larger firms, the fraction of workers who were sampled decreases with firm size. Then, in October of year t, an aselect sample of workers from the wage administration of each firm was drawn and in addition information was obtained on the total outflow of workers within each fu.m. From the workers sampled at October of year t additional information on hours worked and wage earnings was obtained from the wage administration of October ( t-1). Moreover, to obtain information on sepazating workers, a ntunber of workers (consistent with the total outflow rate of the firm) who were present in October of year t-1 and who were not present at October of year t were drawn in addition. After this aselect sample of workers was drawn, it was checked whether minimally 10 workers had a collective wage agreement and 10 workers had no collective wage agreement and whether there were minimally 8 stayers, 8 new workers and 8 sepazating workers in the sample. If this was not the case, the worker sample was extended to obtain those minimiun levels, except of course for those firms which employed, for example, less than 10 workers with a collective wage agreement or which hired less than 8 new workers. On average, more than 75010 of the workers were present at both sample moments. When workers were only present at October t-1 and not at October t(outflow), information was obtained on the new labor market state of the worker.s Thus, the sampling probability for an individual worker depends on the probability that the firm is sampled and the probability that the worker is sampled within the firm, which in turn depends on the size of the firm. It depends indirectly (when less than a mirumum level of a certain worker type was sampled) on the type of wage contract, whether the worker is a new entrant, a stayer or has left in the previoi~s period. For each observation a weight (eqiia] to the inverse of the sampling probability) was constructed. In addition, separate firm weights were constructed which are eqital to the inverse of the sampling probability of the fum. When the tmit of observation in our analysis is the firm, we use firm level weights while when the unit of observation is the individual, we use firm~worker weights to obtain popiilation quantities. As mentioned before, only for some variables (wages, hotus worked), information is available for both year t and t-1 but for the variable which measures the job complexity level this information is not available. Thi~s we have for example no information on promotions within firms between year t and t-1. In addition, we miss the workers who were hired after October t-1 and who left before October t-1. We have information SThe in-and outflow rates appear to be consistent with figures from other data sources (the Dutch Social Security Council), see Gautier (1997) .
on gross wages (also on over time payments and profit shares), hotus worked, days worked, echication, job comple}city level, occupation, age, temue, gender, and type of wage contract. For a detailed description of the job complexity and edncation levels we refer to the appendix and to Venema (1996) , Wiggers (1998), and Gautier (1998) in which the AVO data aze compared with other sotuces.
Tlte advantages of the AVO data aze that we observe both worker and firm characteristics, and that it is based on administrative records so that we have very few cnissing observations. Moreover, the data contain detailed information on the in-and outflow of workers. Finally, education and job complexity, the key variables for crowding out aze meastued independently.
There is also a mmzber of limitations. Due to the complex sample design and the many strata, some (firm) weights become extremely lazge. It turns out that this serioi~sly infíuences certain key variables and leads to differences of the variables in our sample and the Dtttch labor force stuvey (EBB), collected by statistics Netherlands. We therefore chose to remove the records with (worker~firm) weights lazger than 500 from the sample (about 5o1o for each year). Those were mainly workers employed at small firms in small sectors. We have checked whether the new sample is more representative for the entire working popiilation by comparing the distribittions of a munber of key vatiables over time and with the Labor Force Siuvey of the Central Biueau of Statistics and this seemed to be the case (although the weighted fraction of small firms in otu sample is still larger in 1993 than in the other yeazs.s Another disadvantage of this data set is that. it does not contain any information on value added, output, profits, capital and investment.The main reason for this is that the data were designed to stttdy wage growth and therefore only information from the wage aclministration of firms was obtained. Table 2 shows some chazacteristics of the AVO data. We see that most of the means of variables like age, gender and education, are quite stable over time. Also note that relatively more small firms and more workers with a(semi) collective wage agreement were present in the 1993 sample. In otu formal tests of section 4 we will therefore have to control for those vaziables. The behavior of the education and job complexity distributions will be disctussed at more length in the next section.
Descriptive statistics
First, we will show that 1993 and to a lesser extent 1994 can be considered to be bad years in terms of employment opporttmities. The strong recovery of employment in the Netherlands started in 1995 and continued in the years thereafter. Table 5 shows that in 1993 tmemployment increased strongly while few vacancies were created. In 1995 and 1996 unemployment fell and many vacancies were created. Moreover, the v~u ratios for almost all education groups, 6In our analysis in the next section we will however controlfor fam size and in particular for those with only elementary school were lower in 1993 than in 1995 and 1996. This cyclical pattern is also present in the AVO data. Ffom table 2, we see that the difference between the inflow and the otttflow rates was sttbstantially higher in 1995 and 1996 than in 1993 and 1994. In addition, the fraction of workers employed at shrinking firms was higher while the fraction of workers employed at growing firms was lower in 1993 and 1994 than in 1995 and 1996.
In Tables 3 and 4 , we give information on the skill and education structure of jobs and workers based on four AVO stuveys (92-93, 93-94, 94-95 and 95-96) . The samples of period t contain information on employment in period t and t-1. Since job complexity is only meastued once, the differences in fractions of workers employed at a pazticttlaz job complexity level between period t and t-1 in one sample can only be due to differences in the magnitude and composition of the inflow and outflow of workers. Thtts, the differences in the edttcation job complexity distribtttion across samples can be partly explained by the fact. that we miss promotions within firms. We can however not rttle out that some of the differences are dtte to sampling errors. Most of the empirical analysis of the next section will therefore be carried out for sepazate job complexity levels. We see from Table 3 (date t, survey t) that in 1993, 18.5Q1o of all employed workers was reported to be employed at a simple job, in 1994 this was 21.301o while in 1995 this was 19.301o and in 1996, it was only 14.4010. At the same time we see from table 4 that in 1993, 60.9P1o had a lower education, in 1994, this fraction was 61.8Q1o, in 1995 it was 58.4oI' o and in 1996 it was 54.9010. The fractions of workers with primary school only for 1993-96 are respectively: 7.4010, 6.Solo, 7.901o and 6.O~lo. Thus the 1996 sample contains a smaller faction of simple jobs and relatively fewer workers with a lower education than the other samples.
To get some ideas about the empirical relevance of crowding out in the mid 90's we will first test whether a larger fraction of simple jobs was occupied by higher educated workers in the low employment year 1993. The results of otu simple test on the existence of crowding out are shown in Table 7 which indicates that relatively fewer workers with an intermediate and higher education were employed at a simple job (level fl~fl) in the low employment years 1993 and 1994 than in 1995 and 1996.~In 1993, 6.9010 of the workers at simple jobs had followed an intermediate or higher edttcation and in 1994 this fraction was 7.301'o while in 1995 and 1996, respectively 8.201o and 9.9qo of the workers at simple jobs had completed at least an intermediate education. Thus in the high employment years, the average education level at simple jobs seems to be somewhat higher. Under crowding out, we would expect the opposite. The data also give information on the destination of exiting workers. Table 8 shows that workers with a lower edttcation and workers employed at simple jobs have higher layoff rates than workers with a higher education and workers employed at complex jobs. This is Tables 18 -21 give a more e~ctensive view on the distribution of workers aver jobs. consistent with the labor hoarding story we discussed at the beginning of this paper. The layoff rates are much higher for all worker and job types in the low employment year 1993. We also see that in the high employment yeazs 1995 and 1996, the highly edttcated workers move more often to a new job while in the low employment yeazs, the workers with a lower education move more often to a new job. It is likely that those decisions aze based on different motivations. The lower echtcated workers who anticipate a layoff or dismissal dtuing a downturn are likely to increase their search intensity while on the other hand, booms are typically periods when the rewards to seazch are much higher for workers with a higher edttcation. As job search theory predicts, most job to job movements aze from workers employed at sitnple jobs. It is more likely to find a better position when one is employed at the bottom of the job ladder than at the top.
The descriptive statistics in this section show that recessions are not periods in which more highly edttcated workers occttpy simple jobs. We do find evidence that lay off rates for workers with a lower education are higher than for workers with a higher edttcation. In the next section we will test whether there is evidence for crowding out at the firm level.
A test on cyclical crowding out
In this section we directly test the hiring and firing policy of firms with respect to the edttcation reqttirements of their work force. As mentioned before, the hypothesis we test is very mttch related to Olnm's (1984) idea that employers are often reluctant to lower wages during bad times and instead increase education standards for given jobs.
Unlike previotts studies, which have been based on aggregate data, otu data allow us to directly test to what extent employers increase their education standards in periods of increasing tmemployment. In the next section we explicitly define a variable which meastues the difference between average education requirements for the inflow aztd for the outflow at a given job complexity level in a given firm. We test whether this variable is larger during bad times. In the remaining of this section, we say more on the educational reqturements over the cycle for inflow and outflow sepazately and in addition we test for selectivity bias.
Do firms upgrade their work force in bad times?
In this section we perform a direct test of the hypothesis that fums increase the educational level of their work force dtuing bad times. Since the sort of activities within a pazticular job complexity level can change over the cycle we have to define a job at the lowest possible aggregation level. Below we explain how we meastue upgrading.
Let y~k be the average mtmber of years of education for the mfiow into job complexity level k at fum j and let y~kt be the average nttmber of years of education for the outflow from job complexity level k at firm j. s We will assiune that the amount of reqtrired schooling for both inflow and outflow at each job complexity level depends on observable firm characteristics, job specific effects and macro-economic conditions, which are capttued by calendar time diunmies.
where cr~k and n~tare fixed job effects, Qk and Qk t are coefHcient estimates of the firm effects, xjt is a vector with firm chazacteristics in year t, ryké and ?'kit aze coefficient estimates of the calendar time effects, dkt is a dummy which is equal to 1 for job complexity level k and yeaz t and zero otherwise and E~k and e~kt are i.i.d. error terms.
If firms increase education standazds for certain jobs, we expect that in 1993, in which tmemployment grew strongly, the difference between the years of education for the inflow and the outflow at given job complexity leveLs, will be higher than in the high employment years 1995 and 1996. Thiis the effect of dk93 on ( y~k -y,kt) gives us information on potential upgrading of firms. Before we can estimate those effects, we will assume that the firm effects have the same value in both the in9ow and the outflow equations but we will allow the job effects to differ, hence cr~k -tx~t -a~. Thus we estimate
The results can be found in table 9. For most job complexity levels, the effect of dk93 on (y~k -y,kt) is zero or even negative (relative to dkys). Only for job complexity level2 it is significantly positive with a coefficient estimate of 0.31 (s.e. is 0.15).9 We also see that during our sample periods, the mean of ( y~k-y,kt) was positive for all job complexity levels and that most of the upgrading took place at intermediate job complexity levels. It is still interesting to see how the inflow and oiitflow eqtiations behave separately and whether ttunover is higher under sWe excluded retirements from the outflow because the older cohort has in general followed a relatively lower education and occupies relatively complex jobs. Including this cohort did however not lead to any changes of our conclusions. 9We could not reject the joint hypothesis that the coef6cient estunates of the 1993 dummies are zero in all equations (F[5,4319]-1.13). Moreover, we experimented with a recession dummy which takes the value 1 in 1993 and 1994 and zero otherwise. For none of the job complexity levels we found a signiScant effect of the recession dummy. We aLso could not reject the hypothesis that the recession dummy was zero in all equations, F[5,4341]-0.87. low skilled workers. This will be the siibject of the next section. In addition we will check to what extent our results are disttubed by selectivity bias.
Sensitivity analyses and the quality of new and separating workers over the cycle
To get an idea on potential sample selection eftects, we will check whether the fact that both in and outflow are observed has a significant effect on the calendar time dummies for the inflow and outflow equations. Those equations aLso
give information on the cyclical behavior of the education requirements for new workers and whether recessions aze periods in which mainly workers with a lower education separate from a given job. Thus consider the following equations:
Where~t'~k and n,kt take the value 1 when respectively inflow and outflow are observed and zero otherwise. An F-test on the joint significance of~k and {ké and of~k t and f kt t will tell i~s something about different behavior of the fums for which we observe both in-and outflow simiiltaneot~sly. Tables 10 and 11 show that for job complexity levels 1,3 and 4 we cannot reject the mill hypothesis that k and~ké are zero. Including~k n,kt and~kCtdktrt`~k in the inflow equation leads to a somewhat smaller effect of the 1993 dummy. For the outflow equation, we have to reject the mill hypothesis that~k and~ktdke are zero for job complexity levels 3 and 6-8. Those tables also learn i~s that in 1993, the average ediication of both in-and outflow was close to zero or negative (relative to 1996). The estimates for all job levels together even show a significantly negative effect for both the education of the in-and outflow in the low employment years. In the appendix we compaze the hiring and firing behavior of firms over a number of siib samples to learn more about selectivity and in addition we re-estimate equations 1 and 2 with the two-stage Heckman (1979) method. Tables 16 and 17 show that the coefficient estimates of the selectivity terms aze insignificant for all job levels of the outflow equations (except for the one based on the entire sample) and significantly positive for job complexity IeveLs 1 and 3. The coefficient estimates of the 1993 dtimmy are however almost eqiial to the ones in Tables 10 and 11. To sum up, we cannot rule out that some of oiu estimates of the previoi~s section are biased becattse of sample selection. The separate estimates for inand oittflow do show that in the low employment year 1993, the average education of the inflow did not increase (for all job levels together it even decreased significantly) but that the average education level of the outflow level did in general strongly decrease. This suggests that if any form of upgrading takes place in periods of high imemployment, this is the resiilt of outflow of workers with a relatively low education.
4 Do higher educated workers earn more at simple jobs than lower educated workers?
Next, we test whether the wage earnings of workers who have followed relatively many years of schooling at a given job complexity level are higher or lower than the wages of other workers at the same job complexity level within the same firm. In other words, we test whether, conditioning on job complexity leveLs, the returns to schooling are still positive. If this is the case, it is likely that the workers with more schooling are also more productive on those jobs. When workers with relatively many years of schooling at their job level earn less than the other workers this cotdd be caused by a number of things. Firstly, it can reflect a wage penalty which the workers with surplus schooling have to pay becairse of their larger qtut probability. This is consistent with equilibrium search models of the Pissarides (1990) type. When a worker with a higher education woiild temporarily accept a job below his level and would contimie searching for a better job he needs to produce si~ciently more on this job than the workers with a lower ediication to compensate the employers for the smaller match siupliLS (caused by his larger quit probability). Alternatively it could reflect a lower prodtictivity of the workers with surplus schooling. It is for example possible that highly educated workers aze less productive on simple repeating activities than lower educated workers. Finally, observed negative rettuns to schooling at given job levels can be the result of imobserved characteristics of those workers, for which we cannot control, like for example type of study and social skills. In the literature, workers who have more education than required for a certain occiipation are sometimes labeled to be overschooled . We prefer to avoid this term because, although it is possible to measi~re required schooling, it is very hard to determine whether someone is overschooled or not. This is due to the fact that the productivity of a job depends on both worker, firm and match characteristics. Instead, we will define a new variable, z;~k, for every worker and job pair, which equals: (w;~k-w~k) where w;~k is the log of the hourly wage of worker i at firm j at job complexity level k and w~kis the log of the average hourly wage at job complexity level k in firm j. Thus we compare the wage of each worker with the average wage at the same job complexity level in the same firm the worker is employed at. This enables i~s to check whether higher educated workers are more productive on simple jobs and whether the returns to schooling at a given job complexity level change over the bt~siness cycle. Since we want to allow required schooling at a given job complexity to vary across firms, we will define the variable s;~k -(ed;~k-ed~k), where ed;~k is the amoimt of schooling (in years) of worker i at firm j at job level k and ed~k is the average amount of education at job level k in firm j. We can now regress z~~k on various firm and worker c.haracteristics , on s;~k and on calendar time.
where x;~k contains both firm and worker characteristics. We have restricted our analysis to the inflow of new workers at period t becat~se only then we are stue to captttre the firm's wage policy during period t and we don't have to bother about the endogeneity of temue.to Also note that we now use the individual as unit of observation and that we have to weight accordingly.r' When the process of upgrading the work force actually leads to a higher productivity, it is more appropriate to tallc about substitution than about crowding out. Under substitution, we expect that at. a given job complexity level, workers with a higher edtrcation earn higher wages. E~om Table 12 we see that new workers with relatively many years of schooling earned almost the same as the other workers at simple jobs, althottgh the coefficient for job complexity level 2 is significantly negative and for job complexity level 3 it is significantly positive. This result might be puzzling to those who are familiar with the literattrre on "overschooling". Dtmcan and Hoffman (1981), Rtunberger (1987), Hersch (1991) , Hartog and Oosterbeek (1985) and other studies strrveyed in Hartog (1998) all fotmd that the rewards to strrpltrs schooling are positive. None of those studies corrected however for fixed firm effect.s. To get a better idea of the differences between otrr results and those fotmd in the literattrre on overschooling, we have repeated our estimates without correcting for fixed firm effects ( the coefficient estimates with s.e.'s of the schooling variable are presented in the last two rows of Table 12 ). Except for job level 1, the coefficient estimates for the effects of schooling on gross hotuly wages turn out to be highly significant in this case. This sttggests that workers with relatively many years of schooling (given their jobs) tend to select themselves into high wage firms and that. the restdts of the "overschooling" literattrre are mainly driven by selectivity effects.12 Otrr findings suggest that the workers with relatively many years of schooling compared to their direct colleagues trse their education as a compensation for a lack of other skills.
Flrrthermore, we see that at f3-f5, females earn significantly less than males even if we control for job levels. Not inclttded in the table aze the effects of shrinking and growing firms. Only for f5 we found a significant negative effect of the "growing firm" dummy on z,~k, although the value was small (0.05, s.e. oThis is also the reason why for each job complexity level the mean of z;~k is negative. 11 WLS was necessary because more than 300 strata were used in the sample and we therefore could not include all cross products of firm and size classes on the right hand side of the equations.Weighted and unweighted regressions gave however very similar results.
12See Hartog (1998) for a discussion of other measurement problems related to overschooling. 0.02). Also not included are the effects of a collective wage agreement which was only significantly positive for f3 (0.02, s.e: 0.01).
Conclusion
Cyclical crowding out is the process where lower edticated workers at simple jobs are replaced by higher educated workers in periods when jobs are relatively scarce. Crowding out as explanation for the high and cyclical tmemployment rate of lower educated workers has become increasingly populaz in the Netherlands. There aze however many other possible reasons for those facts. Therefore, if we really want to take crowding out serious, it has to be supported by the data. Our results stiggest that in periods of low employment, less workers with an intermediate or higher education are employed at simple jobs, which is inconsistent with crowding out. In addition, we find that for all job types, the average education went tip in the first half of the nineties. For intermediate jobs, the average difference between years of schooling of the in-and outflow of workers is highest.
Only for one of the lower job complexity levels we find evidence that firms tipgraded their work force in the low employment year 1993. For the other 5 job complexity levels we find no evidence for upgrading dtrring recession years. We aLso find no evidence that the average education of the inflow increased dt~ring recession but we did find strong evidence that, in particular during low employment periods, workers with relatively few yeazs of completed education sepazate more frequently than higher educated workers.
New workers with a relatively high edtication earn abotit the same as their colleagues at the same job level at the same firm in the same year. For job complexity level 3(which contains by far the most workers), we find that workers with relatively many years of schooling earn slightly (but statistically significant) more than their direct colleagues at the same job level in the same firm while at job complexity level 2, workers with relatively many years of schooling earn slightly less (btit statistically significant) than their direct colleagues. The general evidence is thus that workers with relatively many years of schooling at given job complexity levels are not more productive at those jobs than their direct colleagties. The difference between otir results and the results in the literattue on "stuplus schooling" is driven by the fact that we take accotmt of firm specific effects. It tttrns out that workers with relatively many years of schooling (compazed to other workers at the same job level) select themselves into high wage firms.
We also conclude that the evidence for crowding out is very thin. As far as it takes place, it is more outflow driven than inflow driven. If crowding out wotild have been an important reason for the high tmemployment rate of lower educated workers, policy makers should stimulate job creation at the top segments of the labor market to encotirage higher educated workers to leave simple jobs. Otu res~ilts siiggest however that it is more likely that lower ediicated workers become unemployed becai~se their jobs aze not productive enough any more. Policies to reduce imemployment of lower educated workers shoidd therefore focus directly on the lower segment of the labor mazket. One can think of decreasing the cost of creating lower educated jobs by means of tax incentives, stimulate the training of lower ediicated workers, or allow firms to temporary lower their wages in bad t.imes. OECD (1996) 
Appendices

A Sensitivity analyses
The estimates of Table 9 potentially suffer from selectivity bias since we observe ( y~k -y,kt) orily for a limited amount of firms. To get an idea of the importance of this problem we will take two approaches. First, we will compare the hiring and firing behavior of a number of sub samples with each other to check to what extent the firms for which we observe simultaneous in and outflow at a given job complexity level behave differently from fu-ms at which we observe only inflow or only outflow at given job complexity levels. Secondly, we reestimated equations 1 and 2 using the two-stage sample selection bias correction approach of Heckman (1979) . The variables n~k and n,kt take the value 1 when respectively inflow and oiitflow are observed and zero otherwise. Let the equations that determine the sample selection be:9 Since the sampling rule is that ( y~k -yki ) is observed when both n~k and n,kt 0 we get an imbiased estimator for E( y~k -y~~x~c, n~k~0, nkt ) 0) when (E~k-E,kt) 1 (n~k, n,kt) . In that case we can estimate the effect of (1ik93 -~i!9 ) on the conditional mean of (y~k -y,kt) by WLS. To test this, we will compaze the coef6cient estimates of ry~3 and ryk93, (for the low employment year 1993) based on different subsets of our sample, with each other. Consider the following equations (in terms of conditional expectations). a E (y~k -y,kt~x~t,n~k~O,n,kt~0) b E(y;k~x;t,n~k 1 0) C E(yjk~2~t, n~k 1~, n~kt~0) d E(y;kl~it, njk 1 9, n,kt 1 0) e E(y,kt~xikt,n,kt 1 0)
f.E(y~~~x~e, n~k G 0, nkt~Q) g E(y,kt~x~t, n~k~0, n,kt 1 0) Comparing (b) ,(c) and (d) gives information to what. extent~rk`is independent of E~k and~~k. We see from Tables 13-15 that. in specification (d), the effect of t.he low employment year 1993 on the edttcation level of the inflow is somewhat more negative then for specifications (b) and (c) at job levels 1 and 2 while for job level 3 it. is slight.ly more positive. Comparing (e), (f) and (g) gives information to what extent rl~k is independent of s~`and rl~k`. From the same tables we see t.hat for job levels 1 and 3, the coefHcient of the 1993 dttmmy is positive or less negative for specification (g) while for job level 2 it is more negative. Finally, comparison of (b-e) with (a) ,(c-f) with (a) and (d-g) with (a) gives tts informar tion on the dependence of (E~k,E,k`) and (rhk,~,k`) . For job levels 2 and 3 we are likely to overestimate the upgrading effect in 1993 by restricting the analysis to firms for which we observe bot.h in-and outftow at given job complexity levels while for job level 1 we are likely to imderestimate the ttpgrading effect in 1993.
An alternative way to test and correct for some of the sample selection bias is to estimate the in-and outflow equations with Heckman's (1979) two-step estimation procedttre. The coefficient estimates of the inverse Mill ratio,~3'ak and iak`gives us information on the selectivity bias.13 Tables 16 and 17 show that those coefficient estimates for the selection terms aze significant for job levels 1, 3 and 5 of the inflow equations and insignificant for all job levels of the outflow equation.
B AVO data
The AVO data were collected by the Dutch "Labor inspection" ( AI) which is part of t.he department of Social Affairs and contains administrative data from workers employed in both the private and the pttblic sector. For otu attalysis we only ttsed workers who were entployed in the private sector. Below we give a more detailed description on the construction of some of the key vaziables. High íb Activities within a certain field which require a higher level of knowledge and experience. The activities take place without direct supervision.
Job complexity levels Simple
ffl Managing activities of an analytical, creative or contact nature, which are imdertaken independently and require an university or comparable level. In this paper we merged f7 and f8 and when reported f6-8 becatuse of the few observations in f~and fl
Education
We have information on 7 types of schooling (total yeazs, including the reqiured schooling to enter a particular type of education, between brackets): Lower: primary, sl (6), junior general, s2 (10) and pre-vocational, s3 (10) Intermediate: senior general, s4 (12) , senior vocational, s5 (14) Higher vocational colleges, a6 (15) and university, s7 (16).
outflow
Workers not older than 60 years who left a firm because of (early) retirement, disability, their test-period ended, layoff, displacement, they reported to have found a new job or they were initially hired from a temporary employment office. We do not observe movements between jobs within fums.
inflow Workers who enter a new firm. Again, we do not observe within firm labour flows.
tenure:
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling date). wage Monthly wages (including extaa time payments, profits shazes etc.) and hotus worked are measured very accurately. We calculated nominal gross hourly wages for each worker and deflated the wage by the constuner price index to obtain real wages.
wage agreement
We distingtush 3 types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective wage agreement (CAO) which is bargained over at the sectoral level. The minister of social affairs has the right to force all firms within a sector to pay the same collectively bargained wage (AW) and fmally there are workers who have a bilateral bazgained wage contract. Those workers are in general employed at higher positions..
part-time~full-time
Part-time refers to working less than 100Q1o of the regttlar munber of hotus occupation We have information on the following occupations :(1) simple technical activities, (2) administrative, (3) computer, (4) commercial, (5) service orientated, (6) creative. (7) management.
sector Althotigh the AVO data contain information on the public sector we restricted oiir analysis to the private sector. We distingttish 12 sectors. (1) agrictilttue and fishing, (2) food, (3) chetnical, (4) metal, (5) other industry, (6) construction, (7) trade, (8) hotels, restatuants catering, (9) transport, commttnication, (10) banking and instuance, (11) other services, (12) health care firm size We have tised the following size classes. (1) 1-9 ,(2) 10-19, (3) 20-49 (4), 50-99, (5)100.199, (6) 200.499, (7)~500 employees. Author(s) Title
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